INTRODUCTION
The interpretation of non-discrimination clauses lies at the epicenter of the practice of international courts and tribunals. 1 In today's world, an important part of the jurisprudence interpreting non-discriminatory standards is in fact "economic." The reason lies with the ever-expanding fields of international investment law and international trade law that led to the creation of a large body of investor-state arbitration awards, WTO Panel Reports and WTO Appellate Body Reports, all of which interpret and apply economic non-discriminatory standards. Although non-discrimination in economic affairs may seem distant from the principle of Sovereign Equality of States, a closer look at these notions reveals that-historically-they were connected. Economic non-discrimination clauses such as the National historical relationship between Sovereign Equality and economic non-discrimination. Montesquieu declared in the 18th century that "[w]e need to clarify history through [the study of] laws and laws through history." 6 Indeed, the study of history is essential for comprehending international law. 7 The understanding of international legal norms cannot (and should not) occur in clinical isolation from their historical context and roots. For example, Todd Weiler, a scholar who emphasizes the importance of historical analysis in international investment law, accurately observed in relation to the international minimum standard of treatment-another legal standard encountered in recent investment treaties-that "any international rules being enforced by such coercive means would eventually come to be inextricably identified with them." 8 Such is the case with the concept of the international minimum standard that was initially imposed unilaterally "by means of military coercion or applied military force" and eventually transformed into a reciprocal standard. 9 In other words, the focus is on the origins and common roots. In addition, such examination also has important practical repercussions, as it can lead to the alleviation of misunderstandings and misinterpretations when interpreting economic non-discriminatory standards. 10 Taking the above introductory remarks into consideration, this article explores the relation between non-discrimination and Sovereign Equality in four parts, including this introduction and a relatively short conclusion. Part II deals with the historical connection between the principle of Sovereign Equality of States and non-discrimination in international economic relations. In particular, Part II focuses on economic non-discrimination in the colonial and Cold War context. Part III analyzes non-discrimination in international trade and investment law from a purely legal perspective. Part IV concludes and offers an exegesis of the discrepancy between the history and present legal construction of Sovereign Equality in relation to economic non-discrimination.
II. CONNECTING ECONOMIC NON-DISCRIMINATION AND SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES: THE HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE
During the Cold War, both the International Law Commission 11 and Soviet international legal scholarship linked non-discrimination in international economic relations and the principle of Sovereign Equality of States together. 12 However, such link was more broadly recognized. In his 1968 monograph on the subject, Khursid observed:
[t]he term discrimination in international law, no matter in what context it is used, cannot be considered apart from the principle of equality inasmuch as it invariably suggests unequal treatment. Trade discrimination in international law should be examined against the general background of the principle of equality of states to determine whether or not it sets up a compulsory standard of equality of treatment in commercial matters. 13 The discarded Japanese proposal during the discussion for the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations expressed the same idea:
[t]he equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all aliens [who are] nationals of state members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction either in law or fact on account of their race or nationality. 14 This idea seems to have survived in various forms to this day. 15 Instead of providing a comprehensive treatment of the subject, the historical perspective will be developed in fragments, focusing on distinct episodes and using historical snapshots. Connecting MFN and National Treatment obligations with the principle of Sovereign Equality can be largely attributed to distinct historical experiences. The first relates to the Colonial era (Section A). 16 In this context, the experiences include: (i) non-discrimination under the Calvo Doctrine; (ii) the notorious "unequal treaties" signed between the Great Powers on the one part and semi-independent, quasi-colonized states on the other; 17 The impact that colonialism had on constructing the European identity (or identities) and the formation of international law cannot be overstated. Naturally, the subject cannot be fully explored herein; rather, the focus will center on how the experience of Colonialism shaped the perception of sovereignty and influenced the development of non-discrimination rules in international economic law. The two above-mentioned examples, however, clearly indicate that historical experience shaped the understanding of both concepts together with their interrelationship. Since privileged and non-reciprocal obligations of non-discrimination regarding trade were granted by non-fully-sovereign States to Western Colonial Powers, the former were conceptually correlated with sovereignty and perceived as a symbol of colonial dependence. COURS 17, 55-56 (1986 
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The Calvo Doctrine
By the end of the 19th century, Latin American countries were no longer European colonies but "important members of the family of nations." 24 Nonetheless, their sovereignty has been violated and their national pride has been humiliated by so-called "gunboat diplomacy." 25 With the exception of the Drago Doctrine, 26 which had a more limited ambit, the Calvo Doctrine traditionally was the guiding principle of the Latin American approach(es) towards international law and politics. 27 Proclaimed by Carlos Calvo, the celebrated Argentine jurist of the 19th century, the Calvo Doctrine had two aspects: one substantive and one procedural. 28 From a substantive perspective, the Calvo Doctrine required equality of treatment between nationals of the Host State and foreigners, therefore rejecting any claim for better treatment, and recognition, of the "International Minimum Standard" of treatment. 29 From a procedural perspective, the Calvo Doctrine denied foreigners access to fora and remedies that were not 24 available to nationals, and effectively limited their options to recourse to the domestic judicial system. 30 At least prima facie it seems that "equality is the central tenet of the Calvo Doctrine." 31 As Paparinskis noted, "[p]robably largely motivated by the abuse of gunboat diplomacy by the Western home States, the Calvo Doctrine relied on the equality of States to argue that . . . alien [s] should not be entitled to better substantive or procedural treatment than the nationals of the host State." 32 The "essence" of the Calvo Doctrine is both "absolute equality" between nationals of the Host State and foreigners and "non-intervention." 33 "As capital importers, the Latin American states saw the Calvo Doctrine as a means of safeguarding national sovereignty." 34 "Taken in its historical and political context, the Calvo Doctrine was an understandable attempt to rid the newly independent states of the trauma of foreign intervention." 35 The link between National Treatment as the floor of investor protection strictly provided for under the Calvo Doctrine was also explicitly highlighted by Latin American countries. 2. Unequal Treaties: The Case of China During the colonial era, the conclusion of unequal treaties in Asia was a "frequent occurrence." 37 Those signed with China during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century were paradigmatic 38 and received overwhelming attention in legal and historical scholarship. 39 A permanent characteristic of these treaties, along with "other humiliating restrictions upon sovereignty" 40 such as extraterritoriality, 41 was the non-reciprocal MFN. The latter, granted on behalf of China to Colonial Powers, was unilateral, "lopsided" and unequal. Later on, and as soon as the Empire of Japan emerged as a competitor to Western States in the Far East, achieving unilateral MFN treatment in China became a key objective of its foreign policy. 42 Murase aptly summarizes Imperial Japan's policy:
Japan had been placed in the difficult position of "victim" under the unilateral MFN scheme imposed by the Western Powers. Yet Japan soon became a "victimizer" in relation to neighboring Asian countries, imposing upon them the same unilateral clause that the West had foisted upon Japan. At the same time, MFN also proved an important technical obstacle in revisionist attempts. 44 It rendered the renegotiation of one "unequal treaty" with a particular Western State without necessarily involving all other Colonial Powers an impossibility. 45 Given the privileged position of foreigners in Qing China, National Treatment was not as common as MFN. 46 However, when they needed to obtain equal rights with the Chinese for their own nationals, they also concluded treaties containing unilateral National Treatment. 47 The non-reciprocal obligation of non-discrimination with regard to trade rapidly became the symbol and synonym of the privileged position that Western Colonial Powers enjoyed in China. 48 with international law." 50 The amalgam of unequal treaties in China was not only inaugurated by gunboat diplomacy and coercion, 51 but also should be viewed as "a special sector of the Chinese polity in which Chinese sovereignty was not extinguished, but was overlaid or supplanted by that of the treaty powers." 52 Against this historical and legal background, it comes as no surprise that the general denunciation of unequal treaties and the abolition of unilateral non-discrimination clauses emerged as a priority for the Chinese National Movement. 53 Furthermore, both nationalist and communist Chinese legal scholars embraced the doctrine of unequal treaties and their invalidity. 54 The juridical apex of this effort was the dispute between Belgium and China before the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) concerning the denunciation of a Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaty between the two States. 55 launched proceedings before the PCIJ. 57 However, proceedings were suspended and a new treaty was concluded in 1928. 58 After the Second World War, the unequal treaties were renegotiated and unilateral MFN clauses were replaced with reciprocal onesArticle I of the GATT being the most important and obvious example. 59 Likewise, the evolution from unilateral to bilateral and then to multilateral National Treatment is seen to:
reflect geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. 67 The territories of the former Ottoman Empire (Syria and Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan, and Iraq), constituted "A" mandates, whose independence was ante portas and enjoyed internal autonomy, German territories in Central Africa (the Cameroons, Togoland, Tanganyika, Rwanda-Urundi) became "B" mandates with the Mandate given responsibility of their administration, while "C" mandates (South West Africa and the Pacific Islands) were "best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory." 68 The three-tier mandate system resulted from a compromise between U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, leaders of the British Dominions (such as Jan Smuts of South Africa and William Morris Hughes of Australia), and the British Empire. 69 This difference in views was also reflected in the economic regime of the colonies under the mandate system. 70 The territories 67 . Id. at art. 22, ¶ 1-3. 68. Id. at art. 22, ¶ 6. In reference to "A" mandates, the Charter states: Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. Id. at art. 22, ¶ 4. The Charter also says the following about "B" mandates:
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League. Id. at art. 22, ¶ 5. For additional explanations about the mandate system, see ANGHIE, supra note 5, at 121-22; KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 16, at 171.
69. See ANGHIE, supra note 5, at 121 (stating that Dominion powers were unwilling to accept any provisions suggesting that former German territories may become independent). 70. In general, the economic provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations did not include a non-discrimination clause or a robust trade commitment for free trade.
classified under "A" and "B" mandates were guaranteed a regime of complete industrial, commercial, and economic equality. 71 footing as to his own nationals, freedom of transit and navigation, and complete economic, commercial and industrial equality; provided that the Mandatory shall be free to organise public works and essential services on such terms and conditions as he thinks just. Concessions for the development of the natural resources of the territory shall be granted by the Mandatory without distinction on grounds of nationality between the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations, but on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the local Government. Concessions having the character of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This provision does not affect the right of the Mandatory to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in the interest of the territory under mandate, and in order to provide the territory with fiscal resources which seem best suited to the local requirements or, in certain cases, to carry out the development of natural resources, either directly by the State or by a controlled agency, provided that there shall result therefrom no monopoly of the natural resources for the benefit of the Mandatory or his nationals, directly or indirectly, nor any preferential advantage which shall be inconsistent with the economic, commercial and industrial equality hereinbefore guaranteed. The rights conferred by this article extend equally to companies and associations organised in accordance with the law of any of the Members of the League of Nations, subject only to the requirements of public order, and on condition of compliance with the local law. 73 In stark contrast, the mandates of territories under "C" mandate were silent on the economic regime, which was the product of a diplomatic compromise. 74 Although the issue of sovereignty in regard to mandate territories remained generally questionable, 75 the three-tier 73. Belgian Mandate for East Africa, 3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL 862, art. 7 (1922).
74. See ANGHIE, supra note 5, at 122 (highlighting that the primary focus of C mandates as protecting "the interests of backward people, to promote their welfare and development and to guide them toward self-government").
75. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 16, at 172 (discussing the varying opinions about
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mandate system consisted of divided territories that depended on their level of advancement-how developed they were (or, more accurately, how the Europeans perceived them to be)-to obtain full independence and sovereignty. 76 In other words, the degree of political autonomy determined how rigid the obligation to accord non-discriminatory treatment would be. Consequently, the complete equality and the stricter prohibition of discrimination in the economic field in "A" and "B" mandates was not difficult to became intertwined with the idea of State Sovereignty.
The U.S. Nationals in Morocco Case
The conceptual link between non-discrimination and sovereign equality can also be discerned within the colonial context in the United States' arguments before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in U.S. Nationals in Morocco. 77 In that case, the United States made a distinction which, while delicate and subtle, illuminates the perception of MFN in the colonial era. The United States distinguished between MFN treaties signed exclusively between Western States and those signed between Western and non-Western States. 78 According to the United States' arguments, MFN treaties between Western States could be seen as devices for assuring permanent equality, because:
[t]heir common foundation of jurisprudence and socio-political development required that sovereign equality and exact reciprocity prevail among themselves. In turn their main object in using the most-favored-nation clause was to obtain a guarantee that exact equality of treatment with all third States be maintained at any given point of time with regard to commercial, shipping, and other such rights and privileges. 79 However, the United States argued that treaties containing MFN concluded with non-Western States, such as Mohammedan States, were primarily concerned with obtaining a privileged position rather than equality of treatment due to the disparity between the social order and legal system of the Mohammedan States compared to their own. 80 At the heart of the United States' submissions to the ICJ lies the idea that equality of treatment through MFN is only possible or desirable between Western Powers.
B. Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law, Sovereign Equality of States, and the Cold War
The conceptual relationship between non-discrimination in trade on one hand, and Sovereign Equality of States on the other, was never explicitly articulated during the Colonial era. By contrast, during the Cold War, Socialist States and jurists attempted to directly and explicitly connect non-discriminatory treatment with the Sovereign Equality of States, also claiming that the latter was a rule of customary law. 81 As you know, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated the greatest possible development of trade ties between States on the basis of equality and mutual advantage. We are firmly convinced that trade provides a good foundation for the successful development of peaceful co-operation between States and the strengthening of confidence between peoples. We consider this view to be fully in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which commits all States Members to the development of friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. that such clauses were meaningless in treaties involving States with non-market economies. 86 In particular, during the Cold War, many of the Socialist States of Eastern Europe became GATT contracting parties. 87 One of the main motivations behind this was the need to emphasize their sovereignty, which was often diminished due to interventions from the USSR within the Socialist sphere of influence, pursuant to the Brezhnev doctrine. 88 Tunkin, the leading Soviet international lawyer of the time, wrote in the aftermath of the USSR's military intervention in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) and argued that the "sovereignty of socialist states actually is popular sovereignty, popular not only in form but in substance because a socialist state serves the people and acts in its interests." 89 He explains that: the principles of equality and noninterference as principles of proletarian internationalism include, for example, not only the mutual obligations not to violate each other's respective rights, but also the duty to render assistance in the enjoyment of these rights, as well as jointly defending them from the infringements of imperialists, in conformity with the principles of socialist 87. Czechoslovakia and Cuba (before they became socialist) were original contracting parties to the GATT. Yugoslavia joined the GATT in 1966, followed by Poland, Romania, and Hungary. Finally, the USSR applied for GATT membership in 1986, but its application was not approved until its dissolution in 1991. Kevin Kennedy, The Accession of the Soviet Union to GATT, 21 J. WORLD TRADE 23, 24 (1987) Grzybowski, supra note 85, at 547. 
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internationalism. 90 Hazard notes that socialist States "value being treated as equals" and points to the "prestige value" of the MFN provision. 91 This approach was also echoed in the ILC report on MFN. 92 It is of no coincidence that Ustor from Hungary People's Republic and Ushakov from the USSR were appointed consecutively as special rapporteurs for the report on the MFN in the ILC. 93 The MFN, "in the Commission's view, may be considered as a technique or means for promoting the equality of States." 94 
III. ECONOMIC NON-DISCRIMINATION AND SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES IN CONTEXT: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND TRADE LAW
Despite the long pedigree of parallel political and legal trajectories, from a strictly legal perspective, economic non-discrimination is considered to be unrelated to the principle of Sovereign Equality of States. Nolde noted in 1924 that discrimination in international trade does not amount to derogation of the principle of Sovereign Equality of States:
[i]n fact, without undermining the principle of legal equality of foreign States in the field of trade, the State may introduce at home rules that will place some nations actually in a better position than others. 95 McRae correctly rejects the link between non-discrimination in international trade and sovereign equality of States, by HOUSTON 100. In his monograph Vierdag explains: the customs authority of the State "treats" certain imported goods unequally by imposing heavy duties on these goods and on similar goods (ceteris paribus) in violation of a most-favoured-nation clause, the discrimination does not concern the goods in question, but the individuals or the State who have rights with respect to the goods. The exporters expected to be under the protection of the most-favoured-nation clause, or, at the diplomatic level, their State was entitled to require equal treatment to the benefit of its traders. by exploiting their comparative advantages. 103 The principle of non-discrimination in international trade facilitates the function of comparative advantage because it facilitates the purchase of goods from the most efficient foreign producers by eliminating national discriminatory protective policies. 104 By contrast, discriminatory measures cause: a misallocation of resources by inducing a shift of resources towards those relatively less efficient producers who are favored and away from those more efficient producers who are disfavored. 105 Further, non-discrimination, and in particular MFN, accelerates the trade liberalization process. When a State reduces its tariffs, the reduction is automatically extended to, and benefits, all States. 106 This generalization of trade liberalization is referred to as the "multiplier effect" of the MFN clause. 107 Noted by the WTO Appellate Body in Canada-Autos, the adoption of the MFN standard in multilateral negotiations "serves as an incentive for concessions, negotiated reciprocally, to be extended to all other Members on an MFN basis." 108 However, this poses the problem of the "free rider," 109 as concessions are generalized even to non-reciprocating third parties, and parties have fewer incentives to exchange concessions in the first place. According to Ludema and Mayda this means that "the theory of trade negotiations under MFN is inconclusive about the importance of free riding, and the empirical evidence is thin." 110 Moreover, while it is possible that trade liberalization could be achieved unilaterally, Bagwell and Stagier explain that unilateralism simply does not work because governments are generally inclined to set tariffs higher than is efficient when determining tariffs unilaterally. 111 Countries tend to focus solely on domestic welfare implications, which creates a prisoner's dilemma-type situation. 112 As a result, free trade based on comparative advantage, which enables the efficient allocation of recourses, is not promoted. Finally, discriminatory policies presuppose that costly administrative border controls are put in place. Schwartz and Sykes underline the information problems that arise from the use of discriminatory tariffs in relation to a product's exit and entry responses over time. 113 Designing an optimal discriminatory policy is difficult in practice, 114 given that the determination of a product's origins, in order to implement a discriminatory policy, requires a complex, non-transparent and costly system of rules of origin. 115 Thus, countries would be better off by endorsing and applying the principles of non-discrimination and Free Trade. 116 For all these reasons the argument that non-discrimination in trade relates primarily to the function of comparative advantage and economic efficiency, rather than sovereign equality of States, seems undeniable. Nonetheless, the above argument is only partially correct as it fails to capture the full picture. Economic efficiency, even broadly construed, is undoubtedly the primary rationale behind non-discrimination. 117 Pauwelyn aptly summarizes the different approaches regarding the rationale for non-discrimination in trade. 118 However, it is generally accepted, for example, that the rationale behind the MFN aspect of non-discrimination is both economic and political. 119 One of the most important political functions of non-discrimination in international trade is to reduce international antagonism generated by discriminatory trade policies, and thus promote international stability and peace. After the First World War, one of the Fourteen Points proclaimed by President Wilson and sought as one of the constitutional principles of the post-war world order, was the "removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance." 120 Moreover, in the aftermath of the Second World War, U.S. Secretary of State Hull stated that:
I have never faltered, and I will never falter, in my belief that enduring peace and the welfare of nations are indissolubly connected with friendliness, fairness, equality and the maximum practicable degree of freedom in international trade. 121 Furthermore, it would be accurate to argue that non-discrimination in trade is neither connected to, nor stems from, the principle of Sovereign Equality of States. Tout court, sovereign equality is concerned with legal capacity, rather than substantive rights and obligations. As classically defined by Kelsen, sovereign equality "does not mean equality of duties and rights, but rather equality of capacity for duties and rights." 122 Likewise, had non-discrimination in trade been an expression of sovereign equality, it would have been prohibited under customary law; yet, according to international case law, the ILC, and prominent international scholars, customary international law does not prohibit discrimination in international economic relations. It is well established that "customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States." 123 While identical conventional and customary rules could coexist in principle, 124 In the case of non-discrimination in international trade, there is no opinio juris to support the granting of MFN or National Treatment without an international treaty. 126 Both MFN 127 and National Treatment 128 are purely treaty-based obligations, and thus both derive their binding force from the treaty which embodies them. Article 7 of the ILC Draft Articles on MFN clearly provides that "no State is entitled to most-favoured-nation treatment by another State unless that State has undertaken an international obligation to accord such treatment." 129 "There is in customary international law no clearly established general obligation on a state not to differentiate between other states in the treatment it accords to them." 130 In AAPL v. Sri Lanka, the first ICSID investment treaty arbitration, arbitrator Assante stated in his dissenting opinion that "[i]t bears emphasis that national and most-favoured-nation treatment does not derive from customary law," 131 while the arbitral tribunal in Genin v. Estonia held that "[c]ustomary international law does not, however, require that a state treat all aliens (and alien property) equally, or that it treat aliens as favourably as nationals." 132 In the NAFTA context, the tribunal in Methanex reached the same conclusion: treatment and denial of justice, 137 "economic sovereignty reigns supreme" in the field of international economic relations. 138 
IV.
CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING THE DISCREPANCY OF THE LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Τhe various historical episodes of the 19th and 20th centuries point toward a strong yet implicit conceptual connection between the principle of Sovereign Equality and non-discrimination in the realm of international economic relations. The formulation of the latter principle, however, left obligations to grant economic equal treatment outside its scope. In other words, the formulation of Sovereign Equality focused exclusively on equal legal capacity of States. Sovereign Equality remained agnostic or indifferent towards the equality of the content of international obligations in general, and economic non-discrimination in particular.
The following hypothesis has been suggested as a possible explanation: by the time that the principle of Sovereign Equality emerged as a central pillar of public international law, the wave of decolonization and (at a later stage) the end of the Cold War, the rise of neo-liberalism in the international economic system, 139 and the persistent economic inequalities between the global North and the global South radically changed the historical, political, and diplomatic context. Importantly, the newly-independent developing states found themselves in an international economic system characterized (in principle) by formal legal equality but also sharp factual inequalities regarding their capacity to produce, develop, and compete at the globalized market. It is in that context that the diplomatic efforts of developing states in the GATT years, and subsequently within the WTO framework, were characterized by repeated demands for special and differential treatment, rather than adherence to the non-discrimination principle. 140 Sarooshi accurately observes in the WTO context that: the substantive value of equality embodied in the non-discrimination principle of MFN simply has no credible reality in practice. That is, that states are not in substance-and do not consider themselves to be-equal, so why should they be committed to treat each other as if they were. 141 As a result, the purely legalistic manner in which the concept was understood show Sovereign Equality as an empty concept shaped by the general historical and diplomatic context. 142 A strictly legal understanding of the principle of Sovereign Equality, which severs it from economic non-discrimination, is not apolitical; it is a deeply political choice that is determined by, and can only be explained with, reference to the history of the concepts of Sovereign Equality of States and economic non-discrimination. 140 . In the Uruguay Round, developing countries submitted requests for negotiation on preferential tariff rates that resulted in developed countries being legally bound to have "special regard to the trade interests" of developing countries and the principle that developing countries' concessions would be compatible with their development processes. 
